Empowerment without emancipation: performativity and political activism among Iranian refugees in Italy and Turkey by Rivetti, Paola
 1 
 
EMPOWERMENT WITHOUT EMANCIPATION. PERFORMATIVITY AND 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM AMONG IRANIAN REFUGEES IN ITALY AND TURKEY 
 
 
  
Dr. Paola Rivetti 
School of Law and Government 
Dublin City University 
Collins Avenue, Glasnevin 
Dublin 9, Ireland 
E-mail: paola.rivetti@dcu.ie 
 2 
 
Abstract: This article examines the centrality of political activism in Iranian refugees’ identity 
and investigates how they perform and incorporate it by considering the interlocked pressure 
of international politics, personal networks and civil society organisations’ assistance. The 
case of Iranian political refugees in Italy and Turkey is of particular interest, due to the 
international visibility the Green movement enjoys, the Iranian people’s historical experience 
of emigration and to the fact that Iran is a subject of great interest for a number of human 
rights NGOs. The article shows how the process of incorporation of “being a refugee” comes 
about not only through classical forms of institutional pressure but also through “unexpected” 
forms, such as NGOs’ efforts of empowering the refugees politically. Despite the positive 
value attached to it, in this context political activism can force refugees into pre-established 
role, such as the one of “human rights defenders” or “Green movement activists.” The article 
brings further evidence to the fact that refugees are merged in a context that dominates them, 
even when it paradoxically tries to empower them. 
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EMPOWERMENT WITHOUT EMANCIPATION. PERFORMATIVITY AND 
POLITICAL ACTIVISM AMONG IRANIAN REFUGEES IN ITALY AND TURKEY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Political refugees are actors of growing importance in international politics, and 
scholars have devoted their attention to this subject producing a rich and diversified body of 
studies, ranging from theoretical issues to sociological accounts of refugees’ every-day life, 
and highlight concerns related to policy-making, international and human security.1 With the 
passing of the decades, the number of people applying to receive asylum has sharply 
increased and the legislation has become more and more complex, distinguishing among 
different forms of international protection and “labels” of asylum.2 Different national and 
international actors are involved in “managing refugees” from the application to get political 
asylum to the last stage of their new life in a foreign country, namely small-scale policies 
favouring local integration. The world refugees inhabit is highly institutionalised and 
governmental or non-governmental actors at both national and international level norm a 
massive part of their life. This is true not only for the administrative process the refugees and 
asylum-seekers have to go through in order to get asylum. It is valid for their personal and 
every-day life as well, since local NGOs and charity organisations often assist them in 
different fields of their lives, from job search to housing and mental health.  
This article examines this institutionalised world and the relations of power that 
compose it by focusing on the process of identity construction among Iranian refugees in 
Turkey and Italy. It contends that the context refugees live in plays a fundamental role in 
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orienting this process and in shaping refugees’ identity. With these premises, the article 
examines the incorporation of such an identity by the Iranian refugees through the analysis of 
the “microphysics of power” they are subjected to3 as well as the subversion the refugees 
enact against these mechanisms.  
Of course, there are a number of studies that have already examined the idea of “a 
refugee” not as a granted definition, but as a social and political construction.4 This essay 
draws from this literature, but examines in detail the process of construction of 
“refugeeness”5 considering three different levels. First, the study focuses on the role of 
refugees’ own network and connections, such as family and friends, in shaping a given 
definition of “a refugee.” Second, it focuses on international politics, which has been 
enhancing the representation of Iranians as a politically repressed people, in particular after 
the 2009 contested election and consequent uprisings. Third, the research looks at the role of 
NGOs, voluntary and charity organisations assisting refugees at the local level, which 
socialise the refugees to “refugeeness” through every-day practices. In the case of Iranian 
political refugees, the interlocked effect of these three levels is particularly powerful in 
showing how “refugeeness” may be enhanced among, or imposed to, the refugees.  Indeed 
the high number of Iranian political refugees around the world favours the flow of 
information towards Iran regarding political asylum and emigration, making this experience 
part of the collective psyche in Iran. Furthermore, the dominant idea that people from Iran 
flee from dictatorship informs both the public opinion and the civil society organisations 
dealing with them.  
The article examines two different aspects of the entwined play of these levels. First, 
elaborating on Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics,6 it contends that this complex system 
of national, international, governmental and non-governmental actors limit refugees’ option 
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for an autonomous process of identity construction, making them conflating their identity on 
“refugeeness” which, in this case, is strongly linked to political activism.   
Second, elaborating on Judith Butler’s definition of “performativity,”7 this research 
examines the mechanisms of subversion and criticism that the refugees put forth. It is 
observed that subversion is an option for refugees, who often claim autonomously their 
rights, criticise the current international policies on asylum and the NGOs’ activities. Yet 
these claims are performed through reiterated “scripts of refugeeness,” the ultimate element 
that legitimate any criticism. They do not reverse the “grammar of domination” they went 
through: acting as a refugee is expected to act remains what actually legitimates them and 
their claims.  
 
LINKING AGENCY AND STRUCTURE IN REFUGEE STUDIES 
 
Refugees, and in particular political refugees, have significantly changed in numbers, 
origins and social background over the last decades. Asylum legislation has changed along 
with international politics after the Cold War, and so has the way in which social sciences 
study political asylum and refugees, enlarging the topics under consideration and enriching 
the disciplinary approaches.8 Refugee studies are a growing body of literature under constant 
redefinition, due to the crucial relationship they hold with policy-making and public opinion.  
Many studies underline the condition of extreme domination the refugees live in: 
forced to flee their own country, they are later subjugated to a tight legislation in the 
receiving countries and often live in harsh conditions.9 Others studies underline the refugee’s 
agency, arguing that a focus on their capacity of reaction is useful in order to avoid 
generalisation and an incorrect representation of refugees as passive victims.10 Following this 
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last strand, Moulin and Nyers defined the contestations organised by refugees as actions of a 
“global political society,” thus granting the refugee, “who are usually denied the status of 
political beings,” 11 with the capacity of critically review the asylum-related policies over a 
number of issues.  
Other studies focus on legal, moral and institutional implications of political asylum,12 
exploring the opportunity for enlarging its legal definition,13 and examining the impact of 
asylum policy on the international system.14 A separated but connected body of literature 
elaborates on the relation between refugees’ movements and human security15 in the context 
of environmental degradation, where the refugees are both the cause and the consequence of 
environmental problems,16 poor food security17 or ethnic conflicts.18  
On the one hand, the focus on refugees’ political and social agency makes the whole 
conceptualisation of the politics of asylum revolving around the refugees themselves. This 
approach underlines the refugees’ capacity of choice and strategic thinking but leaves behind 
the fact that refugees are merged in a context that often dominates them. On the other hand, 
the focus on the structure of political asylum, whether this analysis may be policy-oriented or 
legally driven, is very much centred on the structure of political asylum, neglecting the issues 
connected to refugees’ everyday life, room for action and needs.  
However, far from being two distinct spheres, refugees’ agency and the political/legal 
structure of political asylum interact and are implicated in each other. This is particularly 
relevant if we consider how the refugees’ individuality and agency are managed by 
international, national and local legislations and actors, which compose a complex system of 
multi-level governance. In line with those studies arguing that the legislation and bureaucratic 
practices do not only norm reality but create the objects they aim to regulate,19 
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examines how institutions and organisations working with refugees also participate in 
creating the subject of their action and assistance.  
Political refugees and asylum-seekers deal with institutions at an international level, 
such as the UNHCR, with international non-governmental actors such as Frontline or 
Amnesty International, and with “closer” actors such as national governments, local NGOs 
and policy-makers receiving them in the host country. Recalling the Foucauldian idea of 
biopolitics, which roughly speaking refers to a set of institutionalised practices through which 
the people’s lives are governed and disciplined,20 this article contends that it is within this 
context that the performativity of “being a refugee” takes shape and develops, bridging the 
refugees’ agency and the political and legal structure of political asylum.21 In particular, 
international politics, refugees’ personal networks, and local NGOs assisting them provide a 
clear definition of “refugeeness,” which is offered (if not imposed) to the refugees.  
But this process does not only come about through classical forms institutional 
pressures, it also takes shape through the efforts of empowering the refugees politically. 
International politics, personal connections and local NGOs play a significant role in setting 
political opportunities for refugees. The internationally dominant discourse of democracy and 
human rights has been particularly powerful in framing the political claims of the Green 
Movement and of the refugees coming from that context,22 somehow promoting a superficial 
identification of the Iranians leaving Iran after 2009 with “Green movement activists” or 
“human rights defenders.” Relying on this same democratic rhetoric and political imaginary, 
the Iranian activists from the Diaspora, NGOs and “civil society organisations” play a 
regulative role as well, by providing to the refugees the necessary social capital in a new 
country for continuing with their political activities.23 Although this context seems to offer 
political opportunities for action and criticism to the refugees, empowering them to reclaim 
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rights and “play strategically” with their status,24 at the end of the day it forces refugees in the 
clothes of “democratic activists and human rights defenders.” Instead of “liberating” them 
through political empowerment, such a context may produce a never-ending “performance of 
activism,” through which refugees are acknowledged with a status. This is similar to the 
notion of “gender performativity” as put forth by Judith Butler, who understands gender as a 
social constructed identity formed and incorporated through fixed and reiterated 
performances or “gendered doings.” Such a performativity, Butler argues, can be subverted 
through a process of re-signification and reinvention of gender acting outside of the given 
scripts.25 However, in this case-study, not the process of “empowering refugees politically” 
nor refugees’ criticism to the policies they are subjected to result in a re-signification or in a 
contestation of “refugeeness” itself, despite the positive role attached to political agency. 
Quite the contrary, the contestations and empowerment foster the dominant relations of 
power that see refugees engaged in performing what a refugee is expected to be and acting as 
they are expected to act.  
In order to bring evidences and shed light on these dynamics, the case of Iranian 
political refugees in Turkey and Italy will be examined. The choice of these two countries is 
motivated by the different conditions they offer. The Italian government recognises Iranians 
as refugees, whereas Turkey still adopts the geographical limitations on political asylum. In 
Turkey, non-European refugees are granted as such by the local UNHCR branch only and 
wait for resettlement in a third country in Europe, North America or Oceania.26 Furthermore, 
due to the roll-back of the welfare state, in Italy political refugees are assisted by charity 
organisations and NGOs that follow them in many aspects of their life, providing different 
services and expertise. In Turkey, the number of NGOs and “civil society organisations” 
assisting refugees is growing but still, they are less relevant to policy-making, integration and 
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welfare policies than in Italy.27 Such differences enhance the relevance of the three levels of 
analysis (personal connections, local assistance and international politics) in shaping 
Iranians’ identity as political refugees. In the case of Italy, where Iranian refugees are less in 
number but have a greater access to rights, the role of local NGOs is very relevant to the 
process of identity construction. In Turkey, where many refugees or asylum-seekers spend 
years awaiting for resettlement, the importance of personal connections is enhanced. Family 
and friends can indeed provide information, the necessary social capital for connections 
within Turkey or outside of it, and this can maybe speed up the process of resettlement. The 
relevance of the international level is present in both settings, and it acts powerfully by 
influencing the institutional and NGOs’ attitude towards Iranians and by shaping the 
refugees’ frames of behaviour and self-representation.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This article rests on semi-structured interviews and fieldwork with Iranian refugees in 
Italy and Turkey conducted between 2009 and 2012. The fieldwork in these two countries has 
been preceded by fieldwork in Iran, where I had been conducted research on “civil society 
activism” and dissent between 2005 and 2008. Fifty-two interviews compose the main body 
of interviews but many refugees have been repeatedly interviewed and a significant part of 
my fieldwork has been characterised by participant observation, since many refugees both in 
Turkey and Italy have shared with me their every-day life for a number of months. Like the 
majority of Iranian political refugees or asylum-seekers, they share a general commitment to 
a democratic reform of the Islamic Republic, supported Moussavi or Karroubi’s candidature 
at the 2009 presidential election and oppose Ahmadinejad’s government.  
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This multi-sited field research in different countries and periods allowed me to follow 
the developments of successful and unsuccessful asylum applications, witness the refugees’ 
efforts for conforming to the idea of “a refugee” and the exchange of suggestions on how to 
behave and what to say before the commissions granting the status of political refugee. 
However teaching how to perform refugeeness does not only take place within the asylum-
seekers’ communities, but also through the relations the refugees hold with local NGOs and 
UNHCR. This relation was often characterised by references to the fact that “Iranians have 
struggled for democracy, everyone knows.” 28  I also witnessed refugees’ contestations 
against local policies as well as against NGOs’ behaviour. I have been working as social 
worker assisting Iranian political refugees for two Italian organisations between 2009 and 
2012, and so I have been observing the shaping of refugees’ identity closely. As a matter of 
fact, I have been an active part of it.  
Furthermore, I conducted some interviews with privileged witnesses such as experts 
or social workers from organisations rescuing Iranian activists in The Netherlands and United 
States of America, in order to cross-verify the information I gathered in Turkey and Italy. 
Finally, I want to make clear that I am well aware of the ideological heterogeneity of the 
Iranian communities living outside of the Islamic Republic. However, the majority of the 
individuals I interviewed share a common support for the reformists. The Iranian Diaspora is 
indeed ideologically diversified and there are sharp contrasts among Marxists, liberals, 
monarchists and reformists. This article does not overlook this political diversity but focuses 
on reformists because the individuals with this political allegiance seem to be the majority of 
those who left Iran in the aftermath of the 2009 crisis.29 However, this might not be a case. 
According to the dominant perception, it is the reformists and the Green movement members 
who suffered the most because of Ahmadinejad and the conservative’s repression following 
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the 2009 electoral crisis. Therefore, the reformists and “Greeners” have become somehow the 
prototype of those forced to leave Iran because of their political beliefs. 
 
IRANIAN REFUGEES IN TURKEY: THE RELEVANCE OF PERSONAL 
NETWORKS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS  
 
Since the Islamic revolution, the image of refugee has been crucial in identifying 
Iranians abroad. Iranian réssortissants are normally divided into different waves, the most 
relevant being the one following the 1979 revolution.30 The biggest Iranian population 
outside of Iran is in the United States, followed by Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Australia and Sweden, where it is estimated that some four millions Iranians leave in total.31 
But beyond these Western countries, Turkey is another top-destination for Iranians. 
According to Koser Akçapar,32 it was estimated that 300,000 to 1.5 million Iranians entered 
Turkey after the 1979 and stayed there until the end of the 1980s.  
Since 1979 however other flows of Iranians have increased the ranks of “exiles” both 
in the Western world and in Turkey. During and after the 2009 protests, many have decided 
to leave Iran. According to the statistics of the Iranian Refugees’ Alliance,33 in 2009 almost 
16,000 Iranians applied for asylum worldwide and in 2010 they were 19,000. Iranians 
constitute the highest number of asylum applicants in Turkey, and unofficial statistics 
estimate the number of Iranians currently living in Turkey as somewhere between 200,000 
and 500,000.34   
The issue of Iranian migration has undergone different waves of attention by the 
media and public opinion. Having the 2009 protests been broadcast all over the world, they 
appealed to the international public opinion and constructed a stereotyped image of the 
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Iranian people as engaged in dissent. Those leaving the country have so been attached to the 
image of the opponents, generally represented as young, democratic, “modern,” and educated 
in contrast with a regime portrayed as backwards, anti-modern and above all illegitimate.35 
For Iranians, emigration stands often in between a rational investment and an urgent 
necessity. Activists live in a highly hostile context and risk long-term imprisonment, but at 
the same time share with non-activists harsh economic and social conditions of life. Family 
and personal connections play a relevant role in shaping and developing the idea of 
emigrating, and above all in addressing the réssortissants toward political asylum, which 
seems the best option available. 
 
My family knows that I am here. But they are happy, somehow, they knew that I could 
not live in Iran. They educated me according to European standards. So I cannot live 
in Iran, and they are aware of this. My mother says I will have better chances in 
Europe and she is right. Before I left, we went to a lawyer and they explained me 
everything about political asylum.36 
 
Of course I miss my family. But they gave me so much money for leaving that now I 
cannot disappoint them. I would like to go back, but I cannot live according to the 
Islamic Republic’s standard, I never could. That’s why they supported my decision to 
leave.37 
 
I was a well-known activist in Iran, so my family was kind of prepared to this. Before 
me, my older brother left Iran because of politics […]. So my parents knew that. I 
have always known that they have been saving money for the last years for this 
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purpose […] I had left for a better future: university, well paid job and decent life […] 
I knew from my brother and parents that all this is easier when you are a refugee.38 
 
Considering the role of the families and financial savings, emigration seems a real 
investment for a new, better life outside of Iran. This consideration echoes the studies arguing 
that migration is more and more interlocked with human rights abuses, highlighting the 
problematic nature of a practical differentiation between the “ordinary migrants,” who 
theoretically have not been forced to emigrate, and refugees.39 Indeed, the grip of the Iranian 
regime on society exerts a powerful pressure towards emigration by both sanctioning political 
activism and limiting social freedom. The poor economic performances of Iran are of course 
another pushing factor for emigration. The forced nature of emigration and the will of looking 
for a better existence abroad are two overlapping elements. Iranian refugees themselves wave 
between these two narrations. It is difficult to keep divided the ambition for a better life (find 
a good job, have access to education and language) and pure political commitment as the 
reason for leaving Iran. This seems more relevant if we consider that some of the most 
politically active interviewees stated that they would leave political activism when resettled in 
the third country, where they would think only to university to assure a bright professional 
future.40 
Within the political economy of migration, be it forced or not, the arrival in the host 
country is an important moment. Generally speaking, having friends or contacts arranged by 
the family of origin means to be hosted in a place and easily get information about the 
process of asylum application. In the case of Iranian asylum-seekers in Turkey, if there are 
not friends or relatives helping them, the smuggler plays a fundamental role by giving 
“survival information” about the country. But personal connections are also important to 
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receive the right training: behaving and saying the right things before the UNHCR 
commission is often a major concern for Iranians. I participated in a trip to Van (Eastern 
Turkey) in November 2011 with a group of Iranian refugees who wanted to document their 
national fellows’ conditions of life after the earthquake.41 One of the most frequently 
discussed topics within the Iranian community in Van was the application for asylum to the 
UNHCR, its time-length and possible results. One of the refugees was particularly active in 
offering suggestions on how to perform “refugeeness” at best: 
 
You need to know your rights […] the UNHCR values this as an element indicating 
your previous political engagement. If you don’t show them that you know what 
political asylum is, they will be sure that you are pretending to be an activist […] And 
try to collect letters and statements that prove you have been doing political activities 
in Iran.42 
 
Another participant, a refugee waiting for resettlement in the United States, explained 
that: 
 
Many people here do not have a strong dossier [meaning strong evidences that they 
were doing political activities in Iran] so they need to be the most convincing possible. 
For example, put forth a big name of Iranian politics is a good strategy […] or saying 
that you were working for a human rights group, or reformists’ electoral campaign...43  
 
The political affiliation is a very important element in determining the success and the 
rapidity of the decision process on the asylum-seekers’ application: 
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It works like “bands” (band-ha): if you are a monarchist, you get the Pahlavi 
Foundation’s support and they are powerful and care about you. Marxists are 
practically forgotten here, their resettlement takes many years. No country in the West 
wants them. For reformists, it depends on your connections […] [for] those who were 
embedded in high-level political circles, life in Turkey is easy because they normally 
have money. And they leave Turkey quickly thanks to their contacts. [But even if you 
were generally supporting reformists without any affiliation] it is always better to say 
that you are a reformist and human rights activist.44  
 
This “preference” is somehow confirmed by a social worker of a charity organisation 
based in Nevşehir: “we have precise policies and expectations […] it is clear that our main 
goal is the respect of human rights […] and the protection of human rights defenders […] of 
course, we help anyone is in need.” 45 This becomes clearer considering that the protection of 
human rights defenders is a top concern for the European Union, the United Nations and for 
many other institutions elaborating policies or offering funding for humanitarian action.46  
The obtainment of the status of political refugee is not the only reason for performing 
the role of activist at best. Within the community of refugees, being recognised as a political 
activist determines inclusion or exclusion from the group. Those who benefit from such a 
reputation are well welcomed in the community, whereas those suspected of faking can be 
excluded. This is also evidenced by the internal differentiation determined by how refugees 
joined Turkey. Contrary to those who legally crossed the border, those who were obliged to 
turn to a smuggler for entering Turkey suffered harsh judiciary persecution in Iran and enjoy 
therefore a positive and sometimes a-critical reputation of activist.47  
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Although it seems that by playing strategically with their status the refugees exert an 
independent agency and elaborate options, the efforts of fitting the role of activist reproduce 
the existing set of relations of power according to which refugees have to perform a certain 
role in order to be accepted or considered as worth of help. “Refugeeness” thus becomes a 
performative process, which is embedded and negotiated within a net of unequal relations 
among different actors: the families expecting their efforts to be rewarded by a successful life 
abroad; the institutions granting political asylum, which expect the refugees to “fill out” the 
pre-established role of human rights activists’; and the asylum-seekers and refugees’ 
communities, which internally teach how to behave and speak correctly, or in other words, 
how to perform refugeeness. 
There are some peculiar elements helping Iranians in performing refugeeness. 
Considering the wide spread international representation of Iranians as activists and the 
world-broadcast repression against the Green movement, political asylum is quite easily 
granted to Iranians. For example, it is hold for true that Iranians are political refugees because 
it is widely known that the Islamic Republic is a repressive regime, whereas Afghans are 
regarded as humanitarian refugees or migrants escaping from poverty caused by the enduring 
war and violence. Furthermore, the flexibility of the Green Movement in terms of internal 
organization leaves room for claiming a role within it, and the ambiguity of jobs or activities 
such as the journalist, a profession which is poorly qualified in Iran, or the blogger, may offer 
the opportunity of pretending a role. I am a journalist or I am a human rights activist are 
among the most popular answers to the question “why did you leave Iran?” 48 
Regardless to a real engagement in political activities, the well established 
representation of Iranians as freedom fighters allows single individuals to reclaim a role in 
and eventually feel like part of a wider, collective struggle for democracy. The relevance of 
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“being a political activist” is such that sometimes Iranian refugees perceive themselves as 
more entitled of rights and protection than “ordinary migrants.” This process of 
differentiation is often performed at the expenses of other national groups.   
 
There’s a huge difference between us, the Iranians, and for instance the Afghans. 
Afghans are migrants; they emigrate from Afghanistan because they look for work and 
possibilities to earn money. We do not leave Iran for this same reason. We were 
obliged to leave Iran because we are politically committed and struggled for 
democracy in our country. [But here in Turkey the Afghans] enjoy more rights than us 
[...] this is not fair from the point of view of what we sacrificed: we should enjoy more 
rights than Afghans, and the UNHCR should grant to us the rights it gives to 
Afghans.49 
 
We were told that the Italian government would look after us… we came to Italy and 
though that this was a first world country. They say us that because we enjoy free 
accommodation, free education and a small amount of money every week, we should 
be happy. They compared us to Somali! They said that those people have less than us. 
No free accommodation, for example. But we are not like them. They should not 
compare us to them! We are Iranians and they black people left their country because 
of hunger, not because of a struggle against dictatorship.50 
 
I heard that a social worker compared Iranians to Somali… why she did it? It is 
normal that the Iranians got angry. [The social worker] must respect Iranians, she 
should not compare us to African people. We fought for freedom and were forced to 
leave Iran for this, while they did not… they left their countries because of poverty. 
And still in Italy Iranians enjoy less protection and respect than Somali do.51 
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 Even if these declarations can be considered as exceptional, the examples above are 
relevant in showing how the international representation of Iranians can become the dominant 
and only frame informing the refugees’ self-perception and self-representation. This 
mechanism is enhanced by the refugees’ poor living conditions, which may loosen their 
commitment to universal values such as human equality and rights, highlighting the dark side 
of refugeeness.   
 
THE PARADOX OF POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT. REFUGEES IN ITALY 
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND NGO ASSISTANCE  
 
Beyond being subjected to mainstream representations and peers’ pressure, refugees 
are forced into pre-determined roles through other means too. One of these, paradoxically, is 
political empowerment which, under certain circumstances, pushes Iranian refugees into the 
pre-established category of “Green movement activists.”  
In Italy and many other countries, NGOs and non-state actors have over the last two 
decades assumed a growing importance in substituting the rolling-back welfare states in 
many fields of social policies. Assistance to refugees is one of them.52 NGOs and other civil 
society actors play a relevant role at the local level by mediating among the policy-makers, 
public opinion and the refugees’ communities. They often are the direct interlocutor for 
refugees and play an important role in shaping their identity. NGOs continuously frame the 
definition of “a refugee” by offering them services and establishing dependency and implicit 
reciprocity.53 Furthermore, NGOs often have the political capital needed in order to structure 
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the political field of action for refugees, thus heavily influencing refugees’ political 
capabilities and mobilisation horizons. 
This was particularly evident in the case of an Italian NGO which, in partnership with 
a network of European NGOs focusing on human rights, rescued some Iranian “human rights 
defenders” from Iran and Turkey between late 2009 and early 2010. The refugees were 
indicated by a human rights-NGO based in the US as politically relevant within the Green 
movement and in danger of life. Their survival would have eventually been crucial for the 
future of Iran. The NGO’s reasons for rescuing the activists waved between a humanitarian 
concern over the lack of respect of human rights in Iran, and a more opportunistic will of 
“becoming an important voice on Iranian politics […] because Iran stands at the very centre 
of current Western political concerns.” 54  
In order to carry out a successful project, it was therefore quite important that the 
Iranian refugees did not abandon their political activism. Many studies have revealed how 
NGOs’ assistance depoliticises the refugees’ personal biography, turning them into mere 
objects of care.55 In this case-study, on the contrary, “being an activist” was an element the 
NGOs wanted to protect and strengthen. For this reason, the Italian organisation provided 
contacts and organised conferences by making available its social capital to the refugees, 
setting a de facto field of activism and determining political opportunities for the refugees. 
Among the NGO’s workers and leaders, indeed, the shared idea was that the refugees needed 
their guidance in order to know how politics works in Italy, or for changing their own 
conditions as refugees and influence the Italian politics towards Iran.56  
Some scholars consider the refugees’ contestations, which normally revolve around 
issues related to asylum and welfare policy, as an evidence of growing empowerment and 
emancipation.57 However, in the case-study explored, the efforts for empowering politically 
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the Iranian refugees have resulted in a further strengthening of the role they had to play, 
namely “being activists of the Green movement.” Although this role was evidently becoming 
a too tight and uncomfortable identity, the refugees never criticised it directly. On the 
contrary, they perpetuated the embodiment of the profile of activists as expected by the NGO. 
This is of course partly linked to the rewarding aspects of “refugeeness”: the label of political 
refugee may indeed grant some facilities, such as receiving financial support, education, or 
providing networks and contacts. However, the decision of conforming to the standard 
expected by the NGO in order to enjoy the connected advantages is only a pale expression of 
agency. Indeed, the strategy of non-cooperation with the organisation has a cost being far 
higher than the one of cooperation, and determines risks the refugees are unlikely to bare.  
This mechanism was evident in the occasion of a conference on the Green movement 
and human rights abuses in Iran held in June 2010 before the Commission for Human Rights 
of the Italian Senate in Rome.58 Some refugees expressed their dissatisfaction with a number 
of issues revolving around the political strategy chosen by the NGO. Talking of their own 
political biography before the Parliament was not the political action they liked the most. 
They would prefer, instead, organising public demonstration or sit-ins, in order to attract the 
people’s attention on the on-going repression in Iran. Institutions, according to them, would 
never act significantly against the Islamic Republic.59 However, they were aware of the 
strategic importance that this event had for the NGO and, after receiving pressures and 
assurance by the organisation that they would also receive advantages such as public 
visibility and political credibility from taking part in it, the event took place. 
The refugees also contested the NGO’s attempt at denying their abilities of pointing 
out a set of political opportunities autonomously. As a matter of fact, the NGO was very 
active in discouraging independent political initiatives, and even the refugees’ contacts with 
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media such as BBC Farsi or Voice of America were a source of tension and concerns for the 
NGO. The refugees expressed this discontent by repeatedly affirming their political 
credentials and the consideration they enjoyed in Iran as well-known activists and journalists. 
Further conflicts exploded because, prior the audition to the Italian Senate, the director of the 
NGO asked the refugees to read the drafts of their lectures. This was interpreted as an attempt 
of controlling what they had to say and they felt “treated like children,” whereas they enjoyed 
very high-level political contacts in Iran.60 
Generally, the many meetings and conferences the NGO organised were criticised by 
the refugees on the basis of the fact that they were not acquainted with the political milieu of 
the NGO. Conflicts erupted in December 2010, when the NGO decided to organise a charity 
Christmas dinner to raise funding for a project called “The Shelter,” a programme of 
protection for human rights defenders providing future funding and assistance to the Iranian 
refugees as well.61 All the invitees were people acquainted with the NGO and part of its local 
network. The refugees would have performed the waiters, the parking attendants and the 
cookers, and during the dinner, they would have told their story to the invitees. The refugees’ 
reaction was critical. Being at the centre of the attention made them to feel uneasy, because 
they did not know “who the invited persons are” and whether these would be “on my same 
party if they were in Iran.”  62 Similar remarks were made after their participation in another 
event, the Italian 2010 Peace March, where the refugees where invited as guest stars and told 
their story before the numerous participants on a public stage.63  
 Although they felt quite imprisoned in the political proposal the organisation set up 
for them, the Iranian refugees never subverted the “scripts of refugeeness” the NGO 
expected. Their claims were justified by their political past and by their present legal status, 
so that they did not radically review the NGO’s expectation. The refugees were well aware of 
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this, to the point that the few Marxist refugees assisted by the NGO never expressed publicly 
their annoyance with the over presence of “Green movement” and “reformist” rhetoric in the 
events and initiatives on Iran.64   
The discontent the refugees voiced did not take place outside the performativity of 
refugeeness, and perpetrated the existing unbalanced relation of power among the actors. On 
the one side, the refugees did not feel entitled with the right of choice between acting 
politically or not. They limited their criticism to the practical aspects of the political 
initiatives the NGO designed for them, without questioning their activism. On the other side, 
the NGO kept on shaping the refugees’ field of action, “demanding activism.” 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The “constructedness” of “being a political refugee” is a process working at different 
levels. Personal connections, international politics and NGOs assistance push the refugees 
towards the incorporation of what has been called “refugeeness.” In the case of Iranian 
refugees, this process of incorporation comes about not only through the classical forms of 
institutional pressure, but also through “unexpected” forms, such as NGOs’ efforts of 
empowering the refugees politically. Within this context, the refugees’ contestations and 
criticism do not result in the subversion of how they are expected to act or what they are 
expected to say. Indeed “refugeeness,” which in the case of Iranian is closely linked to 
political activism, remains the device legitimising their claims and criticism. Despite being 
normally associated to a positive function, political empowerment does not entail 
emancipation.  
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Beyond bringing further evidence to the fact that the refugees are merged in a context 
that dominates them, even when it paradoxically tries to empower them, this case study sheds 
light on a number of other issues. First is the influence that the rhetoric related to democracy 
and democratization exerts on the refugees and on the humanitarian agendas of international 
organisations and local NGOs. In particular, the insistence of international politics on the 
discourse of human rights and democratisation and the Iranian Diaspora’s capability of 
exploiting it, have played a crucial role in defining Iranian refugees as pro-democratic 
activists. Notwithstanding some differences, the case of the Kurd refugees is similar to the 
Iranian one in that the Kurds also have re-fashioned their self-representation and ideal cause 
in terms of human rights.65 The second element brought into light relates to the refugees’ 
agency which, according to the findings of the article, is limited and does not subvert in a 
radical way the politics of refugeeness that dominates the refugees. Indeed, this article has 
pointed out that refugees are subject to a number of pressures that push them towards the 
incorporation and the performance of a role. Even if in this context there is room for 
resistance and criticism, the emancipation from the label of refugee is an overly hard task. 
Third, the room for dissent and voice do however change according to the strength of the ties 
linking the refugees and their contacts. Despite being tight and quiet silenced, in certain 
contexts the refugees reject and are critical about the label of political activists. It seems 
indeed that the performativity of “being a political activist” increases its strength in a context 
in which the refugees have weak ties with their respondents. On the contrary, in the context 
of their personal contacts and relations, the refugees seem less keen on playing the role of the 
activists. For instance, families are well aware that getting political asylum could trigger the 
opportunities of getting a better life and encourage their sons and daughters to leave the 
country and apply for political asylum. In a context characterised by strong ties, such as the 
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family, the refugees seem to be allowed to leave their identity of activists in order to put on 
the cloths young people willing to flee the country to have better life conditions. In the case 
of the peers’ community, the refugees are put under two opposite pressures. On the one side, 
the peers are an important means to get information and to be trained for performing the right 
script of refugeeness. On the other side, within the refugees’ communities there are some 
mechanisms of reward and punishment which are adopted in the case of well-known or fake 
activists.  
Finally, this article has some relevance in terms of policies too. It suggests that the 
insistence on a certain element informing the refugees’ identity may lead to the lack of 
emancipation. This is quiet relevant in this case-study because the Iranian refugees are not 
seen as an object of care by the NGO assisting them as, on the contrary, the NGO’s 
programme was aimed at increasing the refugees’ capability of shaping their context and 
actively participating in it. However, the pressure put on the refugees may lead to the 
paradoxical inhibition of such an agency and therefore to empower the refugees but not to 
emancipate them completely.   
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